

Doc. 1621C

X, 1331-

No. 1

機密

東亞建設
第一期總力戰方略(案)

總力戰研究所調製

套書卷	總研資第四十六号
一連卷号	第 20 号
調製年月日	昭和十七年二月十八日
調製張數	一五〇張
處理	所内保管 所外交付分用請按這部

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 1621C

東亞建設第一輯總力對方針 (五)

目次

第一章	一般方針	一
第二章	戰事方針	
第一節	戰事標準	二
第二節	國力整備目標	
第一	戰力整備	五
第二	國力整備	一〇
第三節	占據 (一) 占據 (二) 戰域及其要案	一六
第四節	戰爭手段	
第一	對米國	三一
第二	對英因	五一
第三	對支那	六五
第四	對日韓	七八
第五	聯合施策	九三
第五節	戰爭終結	
第一	終結方策	九八
第二	確保條件	一〇八

第三章 戰域建設

第一節	支那	
第一	軍事	一一
第二	政治	二三

1102

Doc. 1621 C

第三 經濟	一一六
第四 思想文化	一三一
第二節 南方	
第一 軍事	一三七
第二 政治	一四一
第三 經濟	一四七
第四 思想文化	一八一

第三節 北方	
第一 軍事	一九〇
第二 政治	一九一
第三 經濟	一九二
第四 思想文化	二〇一

第四節 滿洲國	
第一 政治	二〇三
第二 軍事	二一九
第三 經濟	二二六
第五節 其他一般事項	
第一 思想文化關係	二四一
第二 經濟關係	二四四
第三 勞務特種人口配分	三四九

No. 3

第四章 國內整備

第一節 軍事	二五四
其一 整備方針	二五四

Doc. 1621C

其二	整備要領	二五四
(附)	科學技術	二六二
第三節	政治	
其一	目標	二六五
其二	方針	二六五
其三	施政要領	二七一
第三節	思想及文化	
第一	方針	二七九
第二	實施要領	二八〇
第四節	經濟	
第一	國防物資	二九七
第二	電力	三〇八
第三	農業生產物	三一
第四	貿易	三一八
第五	交通	三三六
第六	勞務	三五七
第七	財政及金融	三六四

(終)

No. 4

第一章 一般方針

(一頁)

速ニ所要ノ疆域ヲ確保シ長期持久ノ態勢ヲ確立シ且ツ
同盟ヲ活用シテ對米英支戦争ヲ遂行シ對ソノ戰備ヲ
充實シ新支那ヲ育成シ大東亞共榮圈建設ノ初動ヲ律ス
已ムヲ得サル場合對ソノ戦争ヲ遂行スルコトアリ、而シテ戰
争終結ノタメニハ自力存養ヲ以テ眼目トナシ特ニ戰機ノ
捕捉ニ遺憾ナカラシム

今次戦争ノ終結ニ際シテハ大東亞共榮圈建設ノ基礎ヲ
確立スルコトニ努ムヘク少クモ其方向ニ於テ皇國ノ自存
防衛上ノ條件ヲ具備シ且日支再戦ヲ防止スルコトヲ以
テ最少限度ノ要求トナス

第二章 戦争方略

(二—四頁)

第一節 戦争指導

一、大長期戦遂行ノ決意トニ防衛圈ノ要域ヲ占領シテ戦争
ヲ実行スルト共ニ所要ノ自給力ヲ強化確保ス

而シテ戦争実行ノタメニハ英國ヲ主目標トナシ所有手段ヲ
盡シテ自主先制ノ地位ヲ保持スヘク特ニ米英艦隊數ヲ減
ニ努ム且威力圏域ト歐米トノ交通遮断ヲ強化シ又成シ得
ル限り米洲西岸地方ノ交通ヲ破壊ス

特ニ米英ノ東亞ニ依存セル國防物資ノ流出ヲ嚴戒ス

ニ支那ニ對シテハ既定方針ニ則リ占據地域ヲ確保シテ
所要資源ノ開發ヲ図リ且之ヲ新支那建設ノ方向ニ育

成るト共ニ奧地ニ對シテハ武力經濟其他萬般ノ策ヲ盡シテ之カ壓縮壞滅ヲ圖ル

三、戰域物資ノ利用ヲモ計リ國力ノ維持強化ニ努ムト共ニ時日ノ経過就中歐洲戰局ノ變化ニ伴フ米英ノ回復攻勢ニ對シテ之ヲ數手破スルノ戦力ヲ充備ス

四、独伊ノ地中海ノ制圧及英本土ノ逆封鎖並米洲東岸ノ交通破壞等ニ關スル效果ヲ期待ス

情勢ノ進展ニ伴ヒ印支洋ニ於ケル連絡ニ努ム

五、獨國ノ英本土上陸實現ノ機會等ニ在リテハ其衝擊ヲ利用シ威力圖ニ對スル圧力ヲ一段強化スルモノトス

六、ソレ聯ニ對シテハ当面戰爭回避ヲ以テ一般ノ方針トナシ之ニ努力カス但之カ戰備ハ極力充實ヲ期シ以テ情勢ノ變化ニ備フ

米ソレノ我防衛圈内ニ於ケル討日共同作戰ノ發生等已ニ得サル場合ニハ機ヲ失セス討ソレ武力處理ヲ行フモノトス

七、支那奧地ノ和平申込ニ際シテハ之ヲ受理シ既定方針ニ則リ日支問題ヲ解決スルモノトシ更ニ成シ得レハ印度方面ニ進出策應セシム

八、独ソレ休戦ニ關スル協力ヲ請ニ對シテハ之ニ應スヘク又情勢ニ依リテハ之ヲ施案スル場合アリ其成立ト共ニ滿ソレ國境方面ノ安全ヲ確立フルモノトシ更ニ成シ得レバソレヲシテ印度及イラン方面ヘ進出策應セシム

此ノ際独ノ英本土上陸及「アフリカ」制圧ヲ豫期ス

Doc. 16210

- 九. 英(米)休戦ニ際シテハ同時ニ我對米英休戦ヲ處理スルコトス
 - 一〇. 欧米方面ノ全面休戦ニ際シテハ同時ニ大東亞戰爭ノ休戦ヲモ處理スルコトシ、成得ル限リ日支問題ハ別途兩國間ニ講スル如ク措置スルコトニ努ム
- 特ニ東亞ノ機勢於テ欧米方面カ先ニ休戦スルコトニ因ニ嚴重警戒スルト共ニ右最悪ノ情勢ニ處スルノ方策ヲ別途準備ス

第二章 戦争方針 (五—一〇頁)

第二節 国力整備目標

第一 戦力整備

- 一. 第一期ニ於ケル戦力整備ハ對重慶及對米英戦ヲ遂行シ得ニ其回復攻撃ヲ撃退シ得ルニ足ル海軍ヲ備ヘル實ヲ圖ルト共ニ對ソノ戦備ノ完備ヲ期シ以テ其戦ニ備フルヲ以テ目標トス
- 二. 各國軍備ノ趨勢第一表、如クニシテ今後概ネ五年ヲ目途トスル各國ノ東亞侵攻能力ニ關スル判断左表、如シ

No. 7

今後五年ヲ目途スル列國對東亞侵攻作戰能力推定表			
区分	前線兵力(千人)	第一線艦隊(種數)	海軍艦艇
重慶	二〇〇〇—三〇〇〇	若干	十二
米國	六〇〇—一、三〇〇	七—一三	戰艦 二八 巡洋 九一 潛艇 三六五
英國	五〇〇—六〇〇		戰艦 八 巡洋 五五 潛艇 一〇〇
ソ聯	二〇〇〇—三〇〇〇	四—六	巡洋 二 砲 一〇〇以上
備考	一. 前線兵力ハ陸海空軍ヲ合ス後方兵力ハ別ニ略同數ヲ有セシメ 二. 海軍力ハ決戦ノ有意及其結果ニ依リ多大ノ変動アリ		

即ち第一期は、於て各國ノ東亞作戰兵力ノ基準ハ右中数ヲ採ルトキ左ノ如クニシテ米英ソニ関シテハ特ニ欧米方面情勢ノ張弛ニ依リ左記兵力ノ各三分ノ一程を上下スルモト見做ス

(一) 米英二國

前線兵力	百六十萬
第一線航空兵力	一萬機
海軍艦艇	戰艦三十六、巡洋艦百五十 航母三十六、驅逐艦四百六十 潛水艦三百

(二) フランス

前線兵力	二百五十萬
第一線航空兵力	五千機
海軍艦艇	潛水艦百隻以上基幹

(三) 米英ソ三國

前線兵力	四百萬
第一線航空兵力	一萬五千機
海軍艦艇	戰艦三十六、巡洋艦百五十 航母三十六、驅逐艦四百八十 潛水艦四百

(四) 重慶

前線兵力	二百萬—三百萬
航空兵力	若干

全國現戰爭ヲ遂行シテ、前記各國ノ作戰兵力ヲ撃破シ得ルコトヲ標準トシテ計要、戦力ヲ整備セザルベカラス而シテ右ノ之ヲ機械的ニ同數標準トセハ

前線兵力	五百萬(後方ヲ含ム時、一千萬)
第一線航空兵力	一萬五千機
海軍艦艇	戰艦三十六、巡洋艦百五十 航母三十六、驅逐艦四百八十 潛水艦四百

Doc. 1621C

三. 照しども現戦争、推移国力、限夜就中建設過程ニ於テ、可能性等ヲモ考慮スルトキハ五年百ニ右實現ニ、相当、困難アルヲ以テ別ニ戰略上、考慮シテ初メ各般、事情ヲ勘案シテ必要最少限を、一基準ヲ以テ定メ、トシ右基準ニ基テ所要軍需品量並該軍需品基準トスル國家總需要量、推定之左、如シ。

	軍 需	總 需 要
普通鋼材	四、八五〇千吨	一、七〇〇千吨
特殊鋼材	一、一八〇千吨	一、四〇〇千吨
アルミニウム	三五五千吨	三七八千吨
石 炭	九、八九六千吨	一、四、五〇八千吨
航空揮発油	二、五〇〇千坪	二、五二〇千坪
自動車揮発油	一、二四九千坪	三、一五〇千坪

其詳細ニ関シテ、第二表参照。

右、即チ今次戦争遂行、タメ戦力整備上必要トシ、國家生産力擴充目標、概要ナリ。

第二章 戦争方略

(一六—一七頁)

第三節 占 據 (準占據) 範 域 及 其 要 点

一、大東亞戦争ニ於テ占據スベキ範域ハ左記ニ依リ戦争ノ完遂ニ必要ナル態勢ヲ確保スルヲ以テ主眼トシ、作戰ノ進捗ニ伴ヒ漸次中核圈及小共榮圈建設、基礎ヲ鞏固ナラシムル如ク考慮シツ之ヲ制定スベキモノナリ。

- (一) 攻勢ヲ支撐スルベキ戰略上ノ要域ヲ確保スルト共ニ敵恢復攻勢ノ據点タルベキ要點ヲ占據ス
- (二) 我戦争遂行力充實、爲自給態勢ノ確立ニ必要トスル資源要域ヲ確保ス

三、重要資源ノ封鎖及通商交通ノ遮斷ニ必要ナル地域ヲ制扼ス

No 9

DOC 1621C

二南方ニ於テハ我重要資源、獲得ニ達算十カラシムト共ニ、敵ノ武力及經濟戰上、恢復攻勢ヲ制壓、擊推シ、重慶ニ封鎖並ニ米、炭、戰略及緊急資源ニ関スル逆封鎖ヲ徹底ス。占據ニ方リ着眼スベキ要点別紙第一、如シ

三支那ニ於テハ重慶政權ヲ倒壊シテ新支那ヲ育成シ、以テ中核圈ヲ確保スルト共ニ我重要物資、獲得ニ達算十カラシム、占據ニ方リ着眼スベキ要点別紙第二、如シ

四北方ニ於テハ愈々国防基礎圈ヲ確保シ且戰略態勢ノ優位ヲ保持スルト共ニ我戰略物資、獲得ニ達算十カラシム、占據ニ方リ着眼スベキ要点別紙第三、如シ

No 10

第二章 戦争方略 第五節 戦争終結

(九八頁)

第二章 戦争方略 第五節 戦争終結

第二 確保条件

(一〇八一—一〇頁)

戦争終結ニ方リ確保スベキ条件ノ要ハ大東亜共榮圏建設ノ具体的目標ニ対シ可及的接近スルニアルモ其實現ノ程度ハ當時ノ我國力就中我戦果確保ノ程度、他戦争期間ノ長短當時ニ於ケル世界ノ戦局全般ノ態勢力就中我與國ノ地位及対手國ノ疲憊度等ニ依リ異リ豫メ一定シ難シ當時ノ情勢ニ即シ過望ニ陷ルコトヲ戒メテ善処スベキモノトス從テ茲ニハ細説ヲ避ケ三個ノ基本的準據ヲ掲グルニ止ム

其一 戦争短期ニ終結シ対手國餘力ヲ存スル場合

東亜共榮圏建設ノ方向ニ於テ我國ノ生存自給ヲ確保スルヲ限度トナシ

ハ支那ハ既定方針ニ準據スルモ要スレバ若干緩和ノ餘地ヲ存ス
四南方ハ若干ノ主要軍ヲ據点ヲ確保シ石油、鉄、非鉄金屬、食料等必需物資ノ優先取得ヲ確立ス

(ハ) 北方ハ沿海地域問題ヲ解決ス

其二 戦局敵側一應ノ敗戦ニ終結シタル場合

東亜共榮圏建設ノ基礎設定ヲ限度トナシ

Doc/621C

第二章 戦争方略

第五節 戦争終結 (九八頁)

第二章 戦争方略

第五節 戦争終結

第二 確保条件

(一〇八—一〇頁)

戦争終結ニ方リ確保スベキ条件、要ハ東亞共榮圈建設、具体的
目標ニ対シ可及的接近スルニ在リ其實現、程度ハ當時ノ我國力就中
我戦果確保ノ程度、他戦争期間、長短當時ニ於ケル世界戦局
全般、態勢就中我與國、地位及対手國、疲憊度等ニ依リ異リ
豫メ一定シ難シ當時ノ情勢ニ即シ過望ニ陷ルコトヲ戒メテ善処スベ
キモノトス從テ茲ニハ細説ヲ避ケ三個、基本的準據ヲ掲ゲルニ止ム

其一 戦争短期ニ終結シ対手國餘力ヲ存スル場合

東亞共榮圈建設ノ方向ニ於テ我國ノ生存自給ヲ確保スルノ限度トナ
シ

- (一) 支那ノ既定方針ニ準據スルモ要スルハ若干緩和、餘地ヲ存ス
- (二) 南方ノ若干ノ主要軍力據点ヲ確保シ石油、鉄、非鉄金屬食
料等必需物資、優先取得ヲ確立ス
- (三) 北方ノ沿海地域問題ヲ解決ス

其二 戦局敵側ニ應、敗戦ニ終結シタル場合

東亞共榮圈建設、基礎設定ヲ限度トナシ

No. 11

Doc/621C

第二章 戦争方略

第五節 戦争終結

(九八頁)

第二章 戦争方略

第五節 戦争終結

第二 確保条件

(一〇八—一二〇頁)

戦争終結ニ方リ確保スベキ条件、要ハ東亜共榮圏建設、具体的
目標ニ対シ可及的接近スルニアルモ其實現、程度ハ當時ノ我國力就中
我戦果確保ノ程度、他戦争期間、長短當時ニ於ケル世界戦局
全般、態勢就中我與國、地位及対手國、疲憊態度等ニ依リ異リ
豫メ一定シ難シ當時、情勢ニ即シ過望ニ陷ルコトヲ戒メテ善処スベ
キモノトス從テ茲ニハ細説ヲ避テ三個、基本的準據ヲ掲グルニ止ム

其一 戦争短期ニ終結シ対手國餘力ヲ存スル場合

東亜共榮圏建設ノ方向ニ於テ我國ノ生存自給ヲ確保スルヲ限度トナシ

- (イ) 支那ハ既定方針ニ準據スルモ要スルニ若干緩和、餘地ヲ存ス
- (ロ) 南方ハ若干ノ主要軍需據点ヲ確保シ石油、鉄、非鉄金屬食料等必需物資、優先取得ヲ確立ス
- (ハ) 北方ハ沿海地域問題ヲ解決ス

其二 戦局敵側一應、敗戦ニ終結シタル場合

東亜共榮圏建設、基礎設定ヲ限度トナシ

No 11

Doc 1621C

(イ) 支那ハ既定方針ニ準據ス

(ロ) 南方ハ所要ノ軍ヲ基地ヲ確保スルヲ外我國ノ保護指導下ニ
ニ比島ヲシテ獨立形態ヲ採ラシメ英領馬來及北ボルネオ、
ヲ我主權下ニ置キ蘭印ニ經濟上ノ特殊地ヲ設定シ佛印ト共
ニ我國必需物資ノ優先取得ヲ確立シ小自給圈ノ根幹ヲ設定ス

(ハ) 北方ハ東部ニシベリヤヲソシ政権ヨリ分離處理ス

其三、戰局敵側ノ屈伏ニ終結シ我國尚餘力ヲ有スル場合

一舉小英榮園ノ概成ヲ企図スルモノトシ

(イ) 支那ハ既定方針ニ準據ス

(ロ) 南方ハ小英榮園内軍ヲ據点ヲ完全ニ確保シ我國保護指導
下ニ比島及ビルマ、獨立形態並蘭印及佛印ノ自治形態ヲ
具現シ軍ヲ上經濟上所要ノ特殊地域ヲ確定シ英領馬來
及北ボルネオヲ我領土トシ小自給圈タルノ基本ヲ律ス又
濠洲及印度ニ對シテハ所要ノ經濟的結合ヲ規定ス

(ハ) 北方ハ東部ニシベリヤヲ處理ヲ完成ス

第三章 戰域ノ建設 (一一一頁)

第三章 戰域ノ建設

第二節 南方 (一三七—一四八頁)

第一軍ヲ

一、方針

南方戰域ニ於ケル軍ヲ建設ノ基本方針ハ

(一) 今次ノ戰爭目的ヲ完達スル為絕對必要トスル戰略據点(地域)
ヲ把握管制スルコト

(二) 正面作戰ノ要求ヲ充足スルヲ以テ先決トスルモ亦東進建設ノ
方向ニ決意スル如ク考慮スルコト

No 12

Doc 1621C

ヲ以テ眼目トシ、對南方諸施策ニ先行之ヲ實施ス。
而シテ軍ヲ建設ハ作戰用兵上必要トスル施設ヲ先ニ完成ス。
次ニ現地、治安維持及一般交通、通信管制上必要トスル建設ヲ
行フモノトス。

占據地域ハ作戰行動中必要ト認ム期間軍政ヲ施シ諸般ノ建設
ヲ行フ。

二、要項

(一) 軍政ハ作戰上ノ要請及現地、特性其他ヲ斟酌シ、適宜陸海軍
ニ於テ分擔シ之ヲ行フ。

(二) 軍政ハ現地行政、大綱ヲ把握シ、細項ニ亘ル干涉ハ努メテ之
ヲ避ケ、在米機構、活用ヲ計ルモノトス。

(三) 占據地域、治安ハ派遣軍、支援後援、下ニ効メテ在米、警
察機構及住民軍隊ヲ以テ之ニ當ラシムルモノトス。

(四) 占據地域ニ於ケル住民軍ハ其敵性ヲ拋棄シ我ニ積極的ニ
協力スルモノニ限り之ガ存置ヲ許容シ、其、編成、並ニ軍ヲ建
設ハ我ニ於テ之ヲ指導シ、治安警察、墾拓シテ東亞建設
ニ寄與セシムルヲ本旨トシ、極力之ガ善用ニ努ム。

(五) 住民軍隊ノ兵力量ハ戰前兵力ノ概ニ半量程度ヲ標準
トシ、機宜情況ニ據リ之ヲ決定ス。

但シ兵種ハ陸兵ノミトシ、海軍兵力ハ當分、尚存續セシメ
ルヲ原則トシ、艦艇ハ帝國海軍之ヲ處理ス。

空軍兵力ハ存置セシメ、關係諸施設及兵器等ハ現地派遣
軍之ヲ接收處理スルモノトス。

(六) 泰軍ハ我ニ協力セシムルノ方向ニ於テ其強化ヲ図ル。

(七) 住民軍隊ハ分散配置セシメ、派遣軍ノ威力、下ニ置キ之ガ
監視ニ使ナラシムルモノトス。

之ガ所要ノ兵器ハ情況ニ依リ、派遣軍ヲ經テ之ヲ讓與スルモノトス。

(八) 派遣軍ハ軍自体、所要物資、取得及重要資源地域ノ
管制上必要ナル配備ヲ行フヲ通則トスルモ、之ニ差支ナキ

No 13

Doc 1621C

- 限リ勉メテ兵力ヲ直末結シ彈壳性ヲ保持シテ隨時機動ニ支障ナクシムル如ク諸般ノ施設ヲ之ニ適應セシムルモノトス。
- (四) 駐屯軍ノ維持ニ要スル經費ハ止テ得ルモノノ外將來現地ニ於テ之ヲ支辨セシムルモノトス。
- (五) 作戰基地並ニ治安警備上必要トスル軍用施設ハ差当リ敵方既設ノモノヲ修復活用スルモノトシ軍用及警備上ノ措置道ヲ敏活ナラシムル如ク配慮ス。
- 佛印・泰ニ因テハ既定方針ニ準據ス。
- (六) 今次戦争中泰國軍隊ト共同ノ目的ヲ以テ同一地区ニ作戰スル場合ハ兩國了解ノ下ニ帝國派遣軍指揮官之ヲ指導ニ任ズルモノトス佛印軍隊亦右ニ準ずルモノトス。
- (七) 現地ニ於ケル軍政状態ヲ普通ノ行政状態ニ移行スルハ現地ノ事情ヲ勘案シ概テ今次戦争終結ノ時機トスルモ情况ニ據リ今次戦争終結前之ヲ實施又ハ戦後ト雖モ之ガ存續ヲ豫期スルコトアリ

第三政治

其一

- 一 南方ニ於ケル政治建設ノ目標ハ大東亞共栄圈建設ノ理想ニ大東亞共栄圈建設原案ニ照シテ考慮シテ當面今次戦争ノ要請ニ應ズルヲ以テ義トス。即チ南方各地域ニ於ケル英米依存傾向ヲ打破シ我國ヲ指導國家トシテ信頼セシムル如ク施策スルハ勿論ナルモ特ニ作戰遂行及重要戦争資源ノ獲得供出ニ便ナラシムルニ重點ヲ置ク
- 二 從テ今次戦争ノ繼續期間中ハ占領地ノ統治形式ハ軍政ニ依ルモノトス。軍政機構トシテハ軍司令官又ハ占領地總督之ニ當リ其ノ下ニ廣ク官民各方面ノ知能ヲ動員シテ占領地統治ニ遺憾ナキヲ期ス。總督以下軍政ニ參與スベキ軍人及他ノ者ハ占領當初ヨリ流人物ヲ以テ之ニ充ツルヲ要ス。而シテ軍政ハ當面可及的現存行政機構ヲ利用スルニ努メ殊ニ地方制度ハ從來ノ制度ヲ可及的復活利用ス
- 三 占領地住民ノ處遇ニ関シテ將來領土トスベキ所ニ関シテモ一律ニ同化政策ヲ採ルコトナリ各民族ノ天分ニ應ズル如ク方針ヲ採ル。
- 占領地軍政ノ方針トシテ一旦敵性ヲ示タル占領地ノ住民ニ對シテハ當初嚴格ナル處遇ヲ以テ之ニ臨ミ爾後漸次之ヲ緩和スルモノトス

No 14

Doc 1621d

尚占領地住民ト歐米人トハ同等ニ待遇スルヲ以テ原則トス。
四 南方占領地ニ於ケル華僑ニ對シテモ前項ニ準ズ。即一民族性ヲ
示シタルモノハ一度斷乎斷壓ヲ加フルモノトシ其他一般ニ對シテハ公平
ル取扱ヲ爲シ殊更ニ之ヲ壓迫スルノ方途ヲ爲サズ之ヲ以テ今次戦争
ノ遂行ニ協力セシメ殊ニ支那事變解決ノ一助ヲ爲シムル如キ
方針ヲ採ル尚一般支那人ノ南方進出ニ就テハ戰時中ニ之ヲ
抑制スルヲ原則トス
五 日本人ノ南方進出ハ軍方上經濟上ノ戰時的要請ヲ充足スルヲ
主眼トシテ占領地要員ニ限定スルヲ原則トス。而テ其ノ銓衡鍊成
ニキリ特ニ留意ス又農業方面ニ於ケル邦人ノ進出ハ技術的指
導員ニ限ルヲ原則トス
南方進出邦人ノ現地歸還ハ占領地要員ノ適格者ニ限り優
先的ニ之ヲ認ムルモ其ノ歸還ニ先テ銓衡鍊成ヲ行フモノトス。
又兵員ノ現地除隊及要員ノ現地退任ニ関シテモ十分ナル銓衡
鍊成ヲ要ス。
尚各異民族ニ接スルニ當リテハ國民共ニ優越感ニ浸ラズ之ヲ輕侮
スルコトナク又民心收攬ニ留意スルノ餘リ之ヲ恣ニ増長セシ
ムルコトナキヲ要ス

其二 地域ノ区分

一 タイ
同盟國タイニ對シテハ其ノ獨立ヲ飽クテ尊重シ現政權ノ地
位強化ニ資スルガ如ク所要ノ支援ヲ與ヘ一切ノ内政干渉ヲ避ク。
我が軍方的經濟的要請充足ハタイ國政府ヲ以テ自發的
ニ之ヲ十分履行セシムル如ク施策ス。而シテタイノ軍隊ハ共同
戰遂行ノ建前ニ依リ所要ノ協力ヲ爲サシメ特ニ敵國ノ日タイ
離間ヲ防止ス
タイノ華僑ニツイテハタイ國政府ヲ以テ華僑ノ排日的機運
ヲ一掃セシムルニツキ國民政府トタイ國トノ間ニハ友好關係ヲ維
持セシムルモ華僑ニ對スル國民政府ノ直接工作ハ之ヲ爲サシメ大ナル
ヲ可トス

No 15

二、佛印

佛印當局ヲシテ共同防衛及經濟協定ノ忠實ナル履行ヲサシムル所要ノ監視ヲ加ヘ且佛印當局ヲシテ今後益々我方ニ積極的ニ協力セシムル様施策ス。

歐洲ニ於テ爾獨佛關係ノ推移ヲ凝視シテ、佛ノ態度ニ變化ナキ限リ佛主權ハ之ヲ尊重スルモ佛印官民ヲシテ歐洲及東亞ノ新事態ノ認識ニ徹セシメ、軍政ノ經濟各部面ニ亘リ我方ノ實力ヲ扶植強化スルニ努ム。

安南人ノ自治又ハ政治ニ對スル參與ハ將來適當ノ機會ニ或程度之ヲ認めベキモ、差事リ其ノ獨立運動ハ之ヲ行ハシメサルモトス。但シ佛ヲシテ佛印住民一般ノ地位福祉ノ向上ニ努ムシムルモトス。

三、香港

占領地總督ノ軍政ノ下ニ住民ノ分散政策ヲ實施シ、就中海南島ニ於ケル勞務充當ノため其強制移住等ヲモ考慮スルモノトシ差事リ軍政ノ上必要ナル限度ニ於テ復興建設ヲ図ル。

四、比島

差事リ軍政ヲ布キ總督ノ下ニ中央政治機構ヲ置き比島人ヲシテ可及的之ヲ運營ニ當ラシム。比島一應ノ獨立ニ關シテハ共榮團内各地域ノ住民ニ對シ獨立ノ希望ヲ與フル意味ニ於テ特ニ戰爭ノ終末ヲ待ツコトヲ能フ限リ其ノ促進ヲ圖リ、茲ニ共榮團建設ノ模範的一例ヲラシムルコトヲ考慮スルコトアリ。此ノ場合ニ於テモ對英米戰ニ對シ積極的ニ協力セシムルハ勿論戰後ノ駐兵權及軍政基地トシテ特定ノ要地使用權ハ之ヲ保留ス。

五、マレー地方及英領「ボルネオ」

差事リ占領地總督ノ下ニ軍政ヲ布キ「シンガポール」「ペナン」等ヲ直轄シ土侯國ニツイテハ總督直接土侯ヲ指揮シ且所要ノ指導員ヲ配シテ之ヲ指導シ土侯國及州以下ノ行政ハ可及的既存機構ヲ維持ス但行政全般ニ滲透セル英國的色彩ノ拂拭ニ努ム英國的統治方式ヲ改メ各州ノ土侯ノ政治方法ヲ尊重シ「マレー」住民ノ民度ヲ向上セシムル如ク施策ス。尚經濟的變革ニ依ル影響ニ就テハ治安維持ヲ重點トシテ諸般ノ施設ヲ行フ。

DOC 1621C

二 佛印

當面佛印當局ヲシテ共同防衛及經濟協定、忠實ナル履行ヲサセムル所要、監視ヲ加ヘ且佛印當局ヲシテ今後益々我方ニ積極的ニ協力セシムル所施策ス。

歐洲ニ於ケル佛印關係、推移ヲ監視シ、佛ノ態度ニ變化ナキ限リ佛主權ハ之ヲ尊重スルモ佛印官民ヲシテ歐洲及東亞、新等能ノ認識ニ徹セシメ、軍事、經濟各部門ニ亘リ我方ノ實力ヲ殊ニ強化スルニ努ム。

安南人ノ自治又ハ政治ニ對スル參與ハ將來適當ノ機會ニ或程度之ヲ認めベキモ、差當リ其ノ獨立運動ハ之ヲ行ハシムガルモトス。但シ佛ヲシテ佛印住民一般ノ地位福祉ノ向上ニ努メシムルモトス。

三 香港

占領地總督、軍政ノ下ニ住民ノ分散政策ヲ實施シ、就中海南島ニ於ケル勞務充當、タメ其強制移住等ヲモ考慮スルモノトシ差當リ軍事上必要ナル限度ニ於テ復興建設ヲ図ル。

四 比島

差當リ軍政ヲ布キ總督ノ下ニ中央政治機構ヲ置キ比島人ヲシテ可及的之ヲ運営ニ當ラシム。比島一應ノ獨立ニ關シテハ共榮圈內各地域ノ住民ニ對シ獨立ノ希望ヲ與フル意味ニ於テ特ニ戰爭ノ終末ヲ待ツコトヲ能フ限リ其ノ促進ヲ図リ、茲ニ共榮圈建設ノ模範的ニ一例タラシムコトヲ考慮スルコトアリ。此ノ場合ニ於テモ對英米戰ニ對シ積極的ニ協力セシムルハ勿論戰後、駐兵權及軍事基地トシテ特定ノ要地使用權ハ之ヲ保留ス。

五 マレー、地方及英領ボルネオ

差當リ占領地總督ノ下ニ軍政ヲ布キシンガポール、ペナン等ヲ直轄シ土侯國ニツイテハ總督直接ニ之ヲ指揮シ且所要ノ指導員ヲ配シテ之ヲ指導シ土侯國及州以下ノ行政ハ可及的既存機構ヲ維持ス但行政全般ニ滲透セル英國的色彩ノ拂拭ニ努メ英國ノ統治方式ヲ改メ各州、土侯ノ政治方法ヲ尊重シ「マレー」住民ノ民度ヲ向上セシムル如ク施策ス。尚經濟的革新ニ依リ影響ニ就テハ治安維持ヲ重點トシテ諸般ノ施設ヲ行フ。

No 16

總督ノ下軍政ヲ布キ下部機構殊ニ地方行政ニ可及的從來ノ行政機構ヲ踏襲ス。差当リ之ニ「南土平等」ノ原則ノ下ニ南人官吏ニ部及「インドネシア」人ヲ併用ス。南印ハ昔分向臨戦地也タルベキヲ以テ作戰遂行及經濟上ノ要請（特に石油）充足ヲ第一義トシテ嚴格ナル軍政ヲ施行ス。尚能ヲ限リ「インドネシア」人其ノ他住民ノ地位ノ向上民度ノ發達ニ資スル如ク施策シ。激次「インドネシア」ヲシテ南人ニ代位セシメ且戰後一定期間内ニ獨立シ得ルノ希望ヲ與フルモノトス。

七、ビルマ

「ビルマ」ハ相當長期ニ亘リ臨戦地域タルヲ以テ同地ニ嚴格ナル軍政ヲ布ク但シ「ビルマ」人ヨリ成ル行政機構ノ存立ヲ認メ將來獨立政府ノ母体タル如ク指導ス。

「ビルマ」ニ於ケル印度人ノ処置ニ因シテハ村印工作ヲ考慮シツツ其ノ慎重ヲ期ス。

第三 經濟

其一 國防物資

二、方針

(一) 我國ノ戦争ノ遂行力増強ヲ基本目標トシ南方諸地域ノ有スル資源特ニ鉍産資源ノ生産ヲ復舊増充シテ戦争遂行上中核國ノタメ重工業ノ所要原料ノ重要供給源ヲラシムコトヲ以テ本期間ニ於ケル建設方針トス。

(二) 建設復舊ノ中心点ハ石油、鉄鉍石、コークサイト、銅其他ノ非鉄金屬ニ置ク而テ原鉍石類ノ生産ヲ基本トスルモ或程度ノ豫備的製造設備（非鉄金屬ノ選鉍及為シ得ル一部ノ精錬等）及石油ニ在リテハ相當程度ノ精製設備ヲモ建設復舊スルモノトス。

(三) 時期的ニハ当初ノ一、二年間ヲ以テ戦争ニ依ル破壊ノ復舊ヲ完成スルヲ目標トシ爾後所要増産ヲ行フモノトス。

總督ノ下軍政ヲ布キ下部機構殊ニ地方行政ニ可及的從來ノ行政機構ヲ踏襲ス。差当リ之ニ「蘭土平等」ノ原則ナシ。蘭人官吏一部及「インドネシア」人ヲ併用ス。蘭印ハ其分向臨戰地ニタルベキヲ以テ作戰遂行及經濟上ノ要請（特に石油）充足ヲ第一義トシテ嚴格ナル軍政ヲ施行ス。尚能ヲ限リ「インドネシア」人其ノ他住民ノ地位、向工民度ノ發達ニ資スル如ク施策シ。激次「インドネシア」ヲシテ蘭人ニ代位セシメ且戰後一定期間内ニ獨立シ得ルノ希望ヲ與フルモノトス。

七、ビルマ

「ビルマ」ハ相率長期ニ亘リ臨戰地域タルヲ以テ同地ニ嚴格ナル軍政ヲ布ク但シ「ビルマ」人ヨリ成ル行政機構ノ存立ヲ認メ將來獨立政府ノ母体タル如ク指導ス。

「ビルマ」ニ於ケル印度人ノ処置ニ関シテハ村印工作ヲ考慮シツツ其ノ慎重ヲ期ス。

第三 經濟

其一 國防物資

一、方針

(一) 我國ノ戦争遂行力增強ヲ基本目標トシ南方諸地域ノ有スル資源特ニ鉍産資源ノ生産ヲ復舊並擴充シテ戦争遂行上中核國ノタメ重工業ノ所要原料ノ重要供給源ヲラシムコトヲ以テ本期間ニ於ケル建設方針トス。

(二) 建設復舊ノ中心点ハ石油、鉄鉍石、コークサイト、銅其他ノ非鉄金屬ニ置ク而テ原鉍石類ノ生産ヲ基本トスルモ或程度ノ豫備的製造設備（非鉄金屬ノ選鉍及為シ得ル一部ノ精鍊等）及石油ニ在リテハ相當程度ノ精製設備ヲモ建設復舊スルモノトス。

三、時期ハ当初一、二年間ヲ以テ戦争ニ依ル破壊ノ復舊ヲ完成スルヲ目標トシ爾後所要増産ヲ行フモノトス。

Doc 1621C

- (四) 地域的ニ必要物資ノ獲得ヲ急グ見地アリ差著リ戰禍ノ程度尠キ地方ヲ選定スベキモ大量ノ物資獲得ノ期待ヨリ見テ本格的建設ハ蘭印、馬來、比律賓ヲ特ニ重視スルモノトス
- (五) 建設ノ組織トシテハ南方諸地域ヲ包含シテ其ノ建設ヲ統一的ニ規律スル國家的機關ヲ設置シ其ノ大綱的管制下ニ地域別物資別ニ各責任南榮者ヲ選定シ之ヲシテ増産ニ當ラシム
- (六) 錫等ノ過剰生産トナルベキ物資ニ関シテハ差著リ本邦需要量以上ノ生産ハ可及的ニ之ヲ抑制シ依テ生ズル建設餘力ヲ他ノ取必要ナル増産ニ指向スルヲ適當トスベキモ現地經濟ノ混亂ヲ防止シ且ツ該物資ニ依ル對外經濟戰ノ有力手段ヲ保持スル爲メ、資材勞力等ノ大ナル負擔トナラザル限度ニ於テ尚相當量ノ生産維持ヲ図ルモノトス

第三章 戰域ノ建設

第二節 南方

(一八一—一八九頁)

第四 思想文化

- 一 南方諸民族ニ對スル思想文化工作ハ、新附ノ民族ナル點及文化程度低ク民族性概シテ柔順、抗日の風潮ナキ點ヲ考慮シ、第五節思想文化建設一般方針ニ準ジテ之ヲ實施スルモノトス
- 二 理念ニヨル啓蒙

(一) 宣傳

「南方諸民族ハ概シテ日本ニ對スル認識不十分ナルヲ以テ凡有手段及機會ヲ利用シテ日本ノ眞實ヲ反復宣傳シ或ハ出版物ニヨリ或ハ各地都市ニ日本紹介所ヲ開設シテ日本ノ紹介ニ努メ又ハ講演會、展覽會、映画會、音樂會等ヲ開催スル等特別ノ方策ヲ講グ

- (2) 宣傳ノ實施ハ努メテ各民族ノ特性、文化程度ニ應ジテ、實效ヲ期スルヲ要シ尙宣傳實施後ノ反響ヲ檢討シテ更ニ取捨選擇スル等實狀ニ即スル如ク考慮ス

No 18

Doc 1621C

- (3) 南方諸地域ニ宣傳網ヲ拡大強化シ且宣傳ノ大綱及宣傳機構ノ要點ハ日本之ヲ把握ス
- (4) 宣傳ノ対象ハ各地域指導階級知識階級ヲ主トスモ尙文盲大衆ニ対スル宣傳ニツキテモ特殊方策ヲ講ズ
- (5) 南洋華僑ノ秘密結社ハ之ヲ我方ノ宣傳ニ利用スルノ工夫ヲ要ス
- (6) 狀況之ヲ許スニ至ラバ各地指導階級知識階級等ヲ我國ニ旅行セシメ我國實情ヲ紹介スルト共ニ改米依存ノ念ヲ脱却セシムルニ努メルコトヲ考慮ス

(二) 教育

- (1) 既存教育制度及方針ヲ再檢討シ特ニ英米蘭的影響ニ基クモノヲ排シ一般方針ニ依リ方向轉換ヲサシムルモ本期中教育施設ニハ大ナル変更ヲ加フルコトナク成ルベク既存ノモノヲ利用スルヲ考慮ス
- (2) 各地域ノ國民教育、青少年訓練、普及ヲ援助指導等ニ東亞共榮圈理念ヲ植付ケシムル爲少年用、教師用、一般國民用讀本ノ制定、教科書供給等ニ協力ス
- (3) 各地域ノ軍隊ノ指導及教育ヲ適ニ思想確立ニ努ム
- (4) 住民教師養成、再教育ニ協力指導ヲナス
- (5) 我國ヨリ優秀ナル學者、教育者ヲ要地ニ派遣ス
- (6) 諸民族中優秀分子ヲ擧拔シ獨立國ノ當該政府ノ推薦ニ依リ我國ニ留学セシメ我國滯在中ハ之ヲ指導ヲ適切ナラシムル爲特別施設ヲ設ケ修業後ハ一定方針ニシテ活用ヲナス等計畫的ナル留學生制度ヲ設ケ

(三) 思想運動

- (1) 各地域民族固有ノ純正ナル運動ハ之ヲ育成向セシムルモ獨立國ニ對シハ當該政府ヲ適ニ間接指導ヲナス(歐米自由主義共產主義的思想ノ影響ハ之ヲ排シセシムルヲ極力要ス)特ニ民族獨立運動ニシテ偏狹ナル民族主義、民族利己主義傾向ニ墮スルモノハ之ヲ是正シ東洋的道義思想ニ轉向セシムルヲ指導ス
- (2) 戰果ノ擴大ノ即應ニ對英美共同戰爭ヲ遂行ノ強力ナル思想運動

19

ヲ展開強化セシム

(3) 各地先覺具服ノヲ選用計合シ全東亞ヲ打ツテ一丸トスル思想團體ヲ造成セシメ各民族共通意識ノ向上ニ寄與スル事ヲ考慮ス

三、事實ニヨル啓蒙

前記理念ニヨリ啓蒙ト即應シテ具體的實踐的ナル方法ニ依リ民衆ノ實生現ヲ通シテ其集團思想ヲ體得セシムルニ努ム。但シ戦争遂行ノ現實ノ事態ニ鑑ミ實行可能ナルモノヨリ逐次實施スルモノトス

(一) 政治的思想工作

(1) 各民族ノ政治的意欲ハ可能ナル限り之ヲ尊重スルヲ本旨トシテ本期間中豫期スベキ彼等ノ経済的苦惱ノ緩和ヲ図ルト共將來ニ對スル希望ヲ殺カサル様政治的配慮ヲ要ス。例ハ住民参政權ノ維持擴張、住民ノ苦痛トスル惡法令制度ニシテ英米蘭ノ設ケタルモノ、即時撤廢、住民官吏指導者ノ登用活用等實況ニ即セル配慮ヲナシ住民ノ希望熱意ヲ昂揚スル如ク努ム。

(2) 各民族ノ傳統精神ヲ尊重シ住民ノ尊敬スル先哲志士並ニ子孫遺族ノ保護顯彰ヲナス。

(二) 經濟的思想工作

(1) 本期ニ於テハ南方諸民族ノ物的生活ハ相當困難性ヲ増スモト判斷セラレ而モ戦争完遂ノタメ一時彼等ノ困苦ヲ省ルノ道ナキコトヲ豫期セザルベカラズ從ツテ經濟工作ハ最も慎重ナルヲ要シ不必要ナル經濟的苦痛ヲ與フルヲ避クルハ勿論。住民ノ物的生活ニ對シ慈悲ノ心ヲ以テ對處スルヲ要ス。例ハ住民ノ維持育成、敵性英米人所有農地ノ住民ヘノ解放英米ノ設定セル惡稅ノ改廢等民心ノ機微ヲ察シテ適切ナル策ヲ考慮ス。

(2) 南洋華僑ハ敵性アルモノハ之ヲ排除スルモ然ラザルモノハソノ地位ヲ認メ過去ノ重慶ヲ支持シ東亞其集團建設ニ協力セシムル如ク轉換セシムルヲ本旨トス。

(三) 社會文化工作

(1) 住民固有ノ慣習道德ハ其集團建設ニ著シキ支障ナキ限り干渉セザルモノトシ可及的私生活ノ平安ノ不変化ヲ本旨トス。

(2) 戰果ニ依リ被害ヲ蒙リタル住民ニ對スル救荒事業ニ對シテハ

Doc 1621 C

其宗旨、教育、協力云

(3) 醫學、衛生、警察、島病院、巡回診療機關、熱帶醫學衛生

研究所、培養醫學技術關係者、強化擴充之圖云

四、言語政策

將來、東亞諸國、言語、多、未、統一、日本語ヲ東亞、共通語ヲシ
ス、已、進、ム、以、テ、東亞諸國、十、年、内、日本語、普及、各國、ニ、モ、ト、ス、各
國、地、日本語、ヲ、以、テ、南、洋、諸、國、日本語、ヲ、解、スル、住民、ヲ、宣、傳、ス、テ、
宣、傳、ス、或、ハ、日本語、新聞、出版、物、ヲ、普及、ス、以、テ、通、ジ、テ、初
等、日、本、語、教、育、ヲ、ス、テ、音、聲、ヲ、普及、ス、譯、ス

五、現地民衆之教育

(1) 現地ニ、テ、直接、異、民族、ニ、對、シ、日本人、普、實、行、實、踐、日、以、思想
文化、建設、之、影響、ヲ、與、ル、モ、ナ、ル、以、テ、亦、亦、策、ハ、強、カ、ニ
實、行、ス、ル、ヲ、期、ス

(2) 皇、軍、ニ、對、シ、義、理、ニ、通、達、ス、ル、ヲ、期、ス

(3) 現、地、勤、務、員、ニ、對、シ、宣、傳、ス、嚴、選、之、官、制、ヲ、振、興、ス

(4) 邦、人、南、洋、諸、島、ハ、一般、的、復、甦、ニ、許、容、セ、テ、指導、者、ヲ、以、テ、モ
々、々、ニ、制、限、ス、且、現、地、在、住、邦、人、保護、優、遇、ニ、意、ヲ、用、ル、反
面、ニ、現、地、民、衆、ニ、對、シ、異、民族、信、賴、尊、敬、ヲ、受、ケ、ニ、ル、如
ク、指導、ス

(5) 現、地、日本人、小、學、教育、ヲ、重視、ス、且、現、地、民、衆、教育、者、ヲ、養
成、ス、以、テ、國、際、公、道、地、ニ、特別、施設、ニ、設、ケ、ル

(6) 思想、文化、指導、者、簡、拔、養成、現、地、ハ、進、ム、ニ、テ、特別、施設、講
ス、且、現、地、民、衆、ヲ、指導、ス、セ、ル、思想、文化、人、ト、シ、異、民族、實、生活、ニ
深、ク、接觸、ス、思想、文化、生活、實、際、ヲ、通、ジ、テ、異、民族、師、ト、リ、友
ト、リ、ス、且、皇、軍、實、務、ヲ、紹介、ス、東、亞、民族、道、義、的、結合、ニ
寄、與、ス、及、現、地、實、務、探、査、情報、蒐集、ニ、從、ス、以、テ、人物、簡、拔、
養成、配、置、ヲ、國家、的、ニ、計、画、實、施、ス、右、指導、員、選、拔、展、望、
思想、文化、各、方、面、ニ、巨、リ、宗教、藝術、教育、科學、技術、經濟、
社會、各、業、ヲ、實、行、ス、以、テ、人材、ヲ、登、用、ス、ル、モ、ト、ス

六、東亞未來圖建設ニ有、害、ト、認、ム、ル、ヲ、排除

(1) 列、強、之、對、抗、主義、防、衛、ニ、對、シ、共產、主義、運動、ヲ、嚴、重、取締、ス

16. 21

Doc 1621c

- コト
- (二) 反日運動ニ對シテハ積極的啓蒙ニ依リ轉向セシムルヲ本旨トスル
モ頑迷悪性ナルモノニ對シテハニヲ排除ス
 - (三) 英米ノ聯ノ逆宣傳熾烈ナルモノアルベク豫想セラルルヲ以テ、
「ヲ」聴取、制限、新聞、出版物ノ檢閲ヲ嚴重ニスルコト
 - (四) 基督教ニ對シテハ敵性ヲ有スル英米人宣教師ノ布教ヲ禁
止シ住民宣教師ヲ以テ之ニ代ラシメ尙日本人宣教師ノ現地駐
在ヲ図ル
 - (五) 東亞夫栄園建設ノタメ障礙トナル欧米宗拜的文藝出版
物ヲ禁絶シ欧米の敵性ヲ有シ轉向ノ意なき思想文化
人ヲ一掃ス

七 其他

東亞文化建設準備ノ方策文化交流方策ニ就イテハ第一節
ニ準ズ

No. 22

Top Secret

Establishment of East Asia

Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War

Doc. No. - Data of the Total War
Research Institute No. 46

Ream No. - 20

Date of Compilation - 18 Feb. 1942 /17 Showa/

Number of copies prepared. - 150 copies

Disposition - Kept in the Institute

Those distributed outside Institute
to be returned after use.

Prepared at the Total War Research Institute

1335
Establishment of East Asia. Manouvers for the
First Period of Total War (Draft).

CONTENTS

Chapt. I	General Policy	1
Chapt. II	Strategy	
Sec. I	Directing of the War.	2
Sec. II	Objectives of Organization of National Power	
Part I	Organization of Armed Forces	5
Part II	Organization of National Power	10
Sec. III	Occupied Areas (anticipated occupied areas) and their strategic points.	16
Sec. IV	Measures for War.	
Part I	War against the United States of America	32
Part II	War against England	51
Part III	War against China	65
Part IV	War against the Soviet Union	78
Part V	Allied measures	93
Sec. V	Termination of War	
Part I	Termination policy	98
Part II	Conditions of Security	108
Chapt. III	Establishment of operational areas	
Sec. I	China	

1335

DOCUMENT 16210

Page 3

Part I	Military Affairs	111
Part II	Politics	113
Part III	Economics	116
Part IV	Ideas and Culture	131
Sec. II	Southern Areas	
Part I	Military Affairs	137
Part II	Politics	141
Part III	Economics	147
Part IV	Ideas and Culture	181
Sec. III	Northern Areas	
Part I	Military Affairs	190
Part II	Politics	191
Part III	Economics	192
Part IV	Ideas and Culture	201
Sec. IV	Manchuria	
Part I	Politics	203
Part II	Military Affairs	219
Part III	Economics	226
Sec. V	Other General Matters	
Part I	Relating to Ideas and Culture	241
Part II	Relating to Economics	244
Part III	Labour, especially the distribution of population	349
Chapt. IV	Internal Organization	

Sec. I	Military Affairs	254
Part I	Organizing Policy	254
Part II	Outline of Organization	254
Annex	Scientific Technique	262
Sec. II	Politics	
Part I	Aim	265
Part II	Policy	265
Part III	Outline of Administration	271
Sec. III	Ideas and Culture	
Part I	Policy	279
Part II	The Outline of Enforcement	280
Sec. IV	Economics	
Part I	Materials for National Defence	297
Part II	Electricity	307
Part III	Farm Production	311
Part IV	Commerce	318
Part V	Transportation	336
Part VI	Services	356
Part VII	Finance and Circulation of Money	364

Chapter I

General Policy

Remote
The necessary areas of ~~Heinchiang~~ must be speedily secured to firmly establish a long-term endurance attitude; by practical application of the alliance, the war against the United States of America, Britain and China will be carried out. The preparations for war against Russia will be completed and we will promote the growth of New China, thereby effecting the first step towards the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. If it is unavoidable, we shall wage war against Russia. However, our chief object in pursuing the war to its end lies in the existence and development of our national power and special care should be taken to grasp the right time for war so as not to leave any regrets.

On the termination of the present war, we must endeavour to firmly establish the foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. We will make it our minimum requirement to prevent another war with China and we shall equip ourselves at the very least with conditions for the defence of our national independence in that direction.

Chapter II StrategySection I Directing of the War

1. In our resolution to carry out a long period war, strategic points in the defence circle will be occupied, and while we prosecute the war on one hand, our essential powers of self-sufficiency will be strengthened and secured on the other.

In carrying out the war, England will be our main object, and in order to maintain our position of independence and initiative by every means possible we will give special efforts to the destruction of the American and English fleet. We will further strengthen the prohibition of intercourse between the territories under our power and the United States or England, and will destroy the transportation on the west coast of America as much as possible.

We will take strict precautions in particular against the egress of national defence materials for which the United States and England rely on East Asia.

1335

2. Our attitude towards China will be to secure the occupied territories according to the policy previously arranged and to provide for the development of necessary materials. We will promote the growth of these so as to make them contribute towards the establishment of a New China, and in the meanwhile we will endeavour to crush and destroy the hinterland (T.M. - i.e. Chungking) by exhausting their armed forces, their economic abilities and every other measure.

3. We will try to utilize materials which can be procured in the war zones, thus striving to maintain and promote our national power, and at the same time we will complete our military powers so as to be able to overthrow the revived American and English attacks that will follow the lapse of time, especially any change in the European front.

4. We expect good results from the German and Italian domination in the Mediterranean, the counter-blockade on England proper and the destruction of transportation on the east coast of the United States.

With the development of the situation we will do our best to establish contact in (T.M. probably with Germany and Italy) the Indian Ocean.

5. In case of an actual German landing in England proper, we will turn the resulting shock to our own account and further strengthen our power in the sphere of our influence.

6. We hold it as our general policy to avoid war with Russia at present, and will strive for this end. However, preparations must be made to the utmost, to prepare for any change in the situation.

If the unavoidable happens, such as joint operations by the U.S.A. and Russia against Japan within our defence sphere, then we shall seize the opportunity to resort to military methods against Russia.

7. If the Chinese hinterland proposes peace, we are ready to accept it. We will settle Sino-Japanese problems according to our policy previously arranged, and if possible we would like to advance and cooperate with India.

8. We will comply with the request to cooperate in the armistice between Germany and Russia, and we may propose it ourselves according to circumstances. If this is put into practice, our security in the Manchuria-Russian border will be established; if possible, we further / desire

desire the advance and cooperation of Russia in India and Iran.

In this event, we anticipate a German landing on British soil and also her domination in Africa.

9. The cessation of hostilities between our country and the United States and England will be settled at the same time as that between Germany and England. (The U.S....)

10. At the moment that hostilities cease on the European front, hostilities will be suspended also in the Greater East Asia War. We will try to settle Sino-Japanese matters between ourselves, apart from other problems, as far as possible.

We must strictly guard against Europe and the United States concluding a previous truce at the sacrifice of East Asia. We must also prepare some special way of dealing with things if the worst comes to the worst.

Chapter II

Sec. II The Aims of the Organization of National Power

Part I The Organization of Military Strength

1. The aims of the organization of military power in the first period lie in the prosecuting the war against Chungking and the war against the U.S.A. and Britain, and especially in completing our naval preparations so as to be able to smash their attacks when they regain their strength. In the meantime, we must be thoroughly prepared for a war with Russia.
2. The trend of military preparations of the different powers is as set down in Table No. 1 and their capacity for aggression against East Asia during the next five years generally is estimated as follows: -

Table of the Great Powers' estimated capacity for aggressive warfare against East Asia during the next 5 years.

Classification	Front-line Troop strength (in thousands)	First-line Air strength (in thousands)	Naval craft
Chungking	2000 - 3000	Some	none
The United States of America	700 - 1300	7 - 13	Battleships 28 Carriers 18 Cruisers 91 Destroyers 365 Submarines 200
Britain	500 - 700		Battleships 8 Carriers 8 Cruisers 55 Destroyers 100 Submarines 100
Soviet Union	2000 - 3000	4 - 6	Cruisers 2 Submarines over 100 Destroyers 11

Remarks: 1. Front-line military strength includes, army, naval and air forces. Military strength at home is estimated at almost the same number.
2. Naval forces will change considerably, depending on how many naval battles are fought and with what results.

Accordingly, the countries' basic capacity for operations in East Asia during the first period will be as follows on an average basis, the military strength of the United States, Britain and Russia being estimated to fluctuate up to one third of its total according to the tension or slackening of the European front.

(1) Britain and America combined:

Front-line military strength

First-line air strength

Naval craft: Battleships
Cruisers
Carriers
Destroyers
Submarines

1,600,000 men
10,000 planes
36
150
26
460
300

(2) The Soviet Union

Front-line military strength	2,500,000 men
First-line air strength	5,000 planes
Naval craft:	a nucleus of over 100 submarines.

(3) The United States of America, Britain and the Soviet Union combined

Front-line military strength	4,000,000 men
First-line air strength	15,000 planes
Naval craft	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	480
Submarines	400

(4) China

Front-line military strength	2,000,000 - 3,000,000
Air strength	some number

Our country must carry out the present war on one hand, and on the other, must organize the requisite military strength for the aim of enabling ourselves to smash the operational strength of all these countries.

If our aim is mechanical parity we would require:

Front-line military strength	5,000,000 men
(including the home troops 10,000,000)	
First-line air strength	15,000 planes
Naval craft:	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	480
Submarines	400

3. However, there would be considerable difficulty in bringing this about within the next five years, when we consider the changing situation of modern warfare, the limitations of national power, and especially when we consider the probabilities of the process of establishment. We shall thus establish a separate standard of minimum essentials considering all the various circumstances, but strategy first and foremost. The estimated volume of essential military requirements based on this standard, and the total estimated volume of essential national requirements considered on the basis of the military requirements, will be as follows:-

1335

	Military Requirements	Total National Requirements
Materials for ordinary steel	4,850,000 tons	11,700,000 tons
Materials for special steel	1,180,000 tons	1,400,000 tons
Aluminum	355,000 tons	378,000 tons
Coal	9,896,000 tons	140,508,000 tons
Benzine for aviation	2,500,000 litres	2,520,000 litres
Benzine for motor cars	1,249,000 litres	3,150,000 litres

Refer Table II for details.

Such is the outline of the expansion we aim at for our national industrial power as being necessary for the proper organization of our military power in order to carry out the present warfare.

- - - - -

Chapter II Section III Occupied Areas (anticipated
occupied areas). and Their Strategic Points

1. The chief object of the territories to be occupied in the Greater East Asia War is to secure the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of the war in accordance with what follows. The territories will be decided upon in accordance with the progress of the operations, and on consideration of how best to gradually solidify the foundation for establishing a nucleus group and a small Co-prosperity Sphere.
 - (1) We must secure strategically vital areas which would assist our offensive operations, and at the same time capture the strong-points which would afford a stronghold for the enemy counterattacks.
 - (2) To secure territories which produce materials necessary for the establishment of self-sufficiency in order to complete our capacity for prosecuting the war.
 - (3) To control the areas necessary for the blockade of enemy countries in essential materials and the interception of their commerce and communication.

2. Every care must be taken to procure materials essential to us in the Southern Regions and at the same time we must control and smash the enemy's military and economic counterattacks. We must thoroughly enforce
/ our

1335

our counter-blockade of Chungking and of the U.S.A. and Britain in respect of strategy and urgently needed materials. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. I.

3. In China, we must overthrow the Chungking regime and help the growth of a new China, thereby securing a nucleus group, and ensure that all is well with our procurement of materials essential to us. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. II.

4. In the Northern Regions, we must do our best to secure a basic sphere of national defence and maintain our superiority in strategic position. At the same time, we must ensure that all is well with our procurement of strategic materials. The essential points to which we must pay attention in the course of the occupation are as given in Appendix No. III.

- - - - -

Chapter II

Section V. The Termination of Hostilities

- - - - -

Chapter II Section V

Part II Conditions of Security

The main point of the conditions to be secured at the termination of hostilities is to approach as near as possible to the concrete ideal of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, but the extent to which it can be realized depends on our national power at the time, especially on the extent to which we have secured the spoils of our victory, and will also differ according to the length of the war and the general aspect of the world war situation at the time in particular, the position of the countries on our side and the extent of the exhaustion of the countries against us. Any definite prognostication is therefore difficult, and the situation will best be met by reliance on circumstances at the time, and by avoidance of inordinate ambitions.

/ Wo

We shall accordingly not go into details here, but be content to enumerate the three basic principles.

I When the war is soon over with enemy countries left with a margin of strength.

Our maxim will be the securing of our existence and self-sufficiency in the direction of the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged, though if necessary there is still some scope for mitigation.

(b) In the Southern Regions, we will secure a number of the most important military bases, and establish a preferential hold on essential materials such as petroleum, iron, metals other than iron, and foodstuffs.

(c) (In the Northern Regions, we will settle the problems of the Coastal regions.)

II When the war is brought to an end by a single enemy defeat.

Our maxim will be the establishment of a basis for the building of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Regions, we will secure the necessary military bases. We shall let the Philippines enjoy independence under our protection and guidance and shall put British Malaya and North Borneo under our jurisdiction. We shall establish a special economic zone in the Netherlands East Indies and secure a preferential hold on materials essential for our country with F.I.C., all contributing to the foundation of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere.

(c) In the Northern Regions, we shall take measures to sever East Siberia from the Soviet Union.

III When the war is terminated by an enemy surrender with Japan still left with a margin of strength.

We shall plan the establishment of the smaller Co-prosperity Sphere at a single stroke.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Region we shall secure in toto all military bases in the smaller Co-prosperity Sphere; the Philippines and Burma will have their independence under our protection and guidance. In the

/
Netherlands

Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, self-government will be realized and special zones essential for military and economic purposes will be established there. British Malaya and North Borneo will be annexed as Japanese territory and will become the basis of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere. For Australia and India we shall prescribe the necessary economic union.

(c) In the Northern Regions we shall complete the disposal of East Siberia.)

Chapter III

The Establishment of Operational Areas

- - - - -

Chapter III

Section II

The Southern Regions

Part I Military Affairs

1. Policy

The aims of the fundamental policy of the military establishment in the Southern Regions war zone are:

(1) In order to accomplish the aims of the present war, strategic strong points of the most urgent necessity must be secured and controlled.

(2) Although the fulfillment of the demands of the present operations come first, care must be taken to ensure that everything tends in the direction of the establishment of East Asia.

These aims shall be realized in preference to the other policies for the Southern Regions.

In military establishment, provisions necessary for operations and military activities will be first completed, and after that, construction work necessary for the maintenance of public order in the district, general transportation, and the control of communications.

Military administration will be established in the occupied territories during the necessary period of operative activities, to control all the different construction work.

11. Outline.

/ (1)

(1) The army and the navy will bear partial responsibility in establishing military administration, according to operational demands, the characteristics of the area in question, and other factors.

(2) Military administration must grasp the principle of the local administration and trivial interventions must be avoided as far as possible. It will try to make use of the existing machinery.

(3) The public peace and order in the occupied territories will be secured as far as possible by the ordinary police system and the native army, with the assistance and support of the expeditionary forces.

(4) Only those of the native armies that have abandoned their hostility and are positively cooperating with our troops will be permitted to exist in the occupied territories. Their organization, and military establishment will be directed by our army. Their chief purpose is to contribute to the establishment of East Asia as members of the peace police. We must do our utmost to use them to the best advantage.

(5) The standard number of the armed forces of the native armies will be about half of their pre-war number, and will be decided upon according to circumstances.

The type of troops will be limited to land troops, it being our principle not to let them have any naval forces for the time being. The Imperial Navy will manage their ships.

Air forces will not exist and all associated establishments and armaments will be confiscated and disposed of by the expeditionary forces.

(6) The Thailand army will be strengthened on condition of its cooperation with us. Its administration must grasp the principle of the local administration and trivial interventions must be avoided as far as possible.

(7) Native armies will be widely dispersed, and put under the authority of the expeditionary force to facilitate their supervision.

(8) The public peace and order in the occupied territories will be secured as far as possible by the ordinary police system and the native army, with the assistance and support of the expeditionary forces.

(9) As a general rule, expeditionary forces will be stationed in places necessary for the procurement of articles required by the armed forces, and the control of the areas producing essential materials, but our forces should be concentrated as far as does not interfere with the foregoing, and thereby maintain the elasticity of the army and adjust all the varieties of its equipment so as to ensure its instantaneous operation.

(10) Expenses necessary for the maintenance of the occupation forces will be defrayed in future, wherever possible, by the areas concerned.

The type of troops will be limited to land troops, it being our principle not to let them have any naval forces for the time being.

1335

(10) For military equipment necessary for operational bases and the guarding of public order refitted enemy equipment will be used for the time being, so as to expedite and execute military and guarding measures.

We shall act according to our previously decided policy in French Indo-China and Thailand.

(11) During the present war, if there is any occasion for our forces to operate in the same district as the Thai army for the same object, the commanding officer of the Imperial expeditionary forces will assume command by mutual understanding of both countries.

This will also apply to the French Indo-China army.

(12) The time for military administration to change to ordinary administration will be generally at the end of the war, after consideration of the actual situation in the areas concerned, though there may be cases when ordinary administration is introduced before the termination of the present war, or the military administration still continued even after the end of the war, according to circumstances.

Part II Politics

No. I

1. The most important object of political construction in the Southern Regions at present is to comply with the demands of the present war, in consideration of the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (cf. Draft Plan of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.) In other words, although, of course, we must crush the tendency in the Southern Regions to rely on the United States and Britain and guide them into a belief in ourselves as the leading nation, we must lay stress on facilitating the procurement and delivery of the necessary military materials, and on carrying out operations.

2. The form of administration in the occupied areas will thus be military administration during the war. As for its organization, a military commanding officer or a governor-general will be appointed to this office, with a number of able officials and civilians under him, called upon to fully administer the occupied territories.

It is necessary to choose from the very first the most able military officers and others for all who are to participate in the military administration, not to mention the governor-general himself.

The military administration will utilize the present administrative system as far as possible, and special care must be taken to restore and utilize the local system.

Concerning

1335

3. Concerning the management of the natives of the occupied territories, it is better not to force assimilative measures even in areas to be later annexed, but to adopt such policies as will agree with the natural abilities of the different races. It will be the policy of military administration to exercise strict control over the natives in all occupied areas who have previously shown hostile feelings towards us, and gradually slacken it. It will be our principle to treat the Europeans and the Americans in the occupied territories as we do the natives.

4. The Chinese in the occupied territories will also be treated in the same way. Strict supervision will be exercised over those who have previously shown hostility, but the others will generally be treated justly with no special measures taken to oppress them. We will take steps to make them cooperate in the accomplishment of the present war, and especially to use their assistance in the settlement of the China Incident. Furthermore, our rule will be to control the southward advance of the ordinary Chinese during the war.

5. The southward advance of the Japanese will aim at the fulfilment of our wartime demands of a military and economic nature, and as a rule, it will be restricted to essential personnel for the occupied territories, great care being taken of their selection and education.

In the agricultural field, the rule will be to limit the advance of the Japanese to technical instructors.

The return of Japanese who have lived in the Southern Regions to the areas concerned will be permitted on a preferential basis only to those who are eligible as occupation members, but they must be selected and trained before returning. Adequate selection and training must also be given to military men discharged overseas and the officials who retire abroad.

Furthermore, when coming in contact with different races, officials and civilians must not feel that they are superior to them or treat them with contempt. On the other hand, they must be careful not to spoil the natives by being too anxious to win their hearts.

No. II

Regional Divisions

1. Thailand

We shall respect the independence of Thailand, our ally, to the utmost, give all necessary assistance such as would contribute to strengthening the position of the present regime, and avoid all interference with domestic affairs. We shall adopt measures to make the /
Government

1335

government of Thailand comply fully of her own free will with our military and economic demands.

The military forces of Thailand will give cooperation necessary for the accomplishment of the common aim. Special precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intentions to separate Japan and Thailand.

We will make the government of Thailand obliterate all anti-Japanese tendencies among the Chinese residents of Thailand. The friendly relations between our government and Thailand should be maintained, and it would be better for the national government not to take any direct measures against the Chinese in Thailand.

2. French Indo-China

For the present, necessary supervision will be exercised over French Indo-China to ensure that she faithfully fulfils the treaty for joint defence and economy, and that the present government of F.I.C. adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.

We shall keep a close watch on German-French relations in Europe and as long as there is no change in the attitude of the French Government, we shall respect French sovereignty, though we shall do our best to bring home to the officials and population of French Indo-China a thorough understanding of the new situation in Europe and Asia, and to plant and promote our power in both military and economic fields.

Although the self government or the participation in politics of the Annamites will have to be recognized to some extent on some proper occasion in the future, for the present we shall not permit their independence movements, though we shall ask France to improve the position and welfare of the natives in general.

3. Hongkong

We shall enforce a policy of dispersing the population under the military administration of the governor-general of the occupied areas, and we shall consider compulsory migration to supply the labour demands in Hainan Island. At present, reconstruction works will be limited to those of military necessity.

4. The Philippines

Military administration will be enforced for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-general, which the Philippines will gradually be made to run themselves as far as possible. The independence of the Philippines will be accelerated as fast as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as

it

1335

government of Thailand comply fully of her own free will with our military and economic demands.

The military forces of Thailand will give cooperation necessary for the accomplishment of the common aim. Special precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intentions to separate Japan and Thailand.

We will make the government of Thailand obliterate all anti-Japanese tendencies among the Chinese residents of Thailand. The friendly relations between our government and Thailand should be maintained, and it would be better for the national government not to take any direct measures against the Chinese in Thailand.

2. French Indo-China

For the present, necessary supervision will be exercised over French Indo-China to ensure that she faithfully fulfils the treaty for joint defence and economy, and that the present government of F.I.C. adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.

We shall keep a close watch on German-French relations in Europe and as long as there is no change in the attitude of the French Government, we shall respect French sovereignty, though we shall do our best to bring home to the officials and population of French Indo-China a thorough understanding of the new situation in Europe and Asia, and to plant and promote our power in both military and economic fields.

Although the self government or the participation in politics of the Annamites will have to be recognized to some extent on some proper occasion in the future, for the present we shall not permit their independence movements, though we shall ask France to improve the position and welfare of the natives in general.

3. Hongkong

We shall enforce a policy of dispersing the population under the military administration of the governor-general of the occupied areas, and we shall consider compulsory migration to supply the labour demands in Hainan Island. At present, reconstruction works will be limited to those of military necessity.

4. The Philippines

Military administration will be enforced for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-general, which the Philippines will gradually be made to run themselves as far as possible. The independence of the Philippines will be accelerated as fast as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as

it

1335

it would be a means to instigate the desire for independence among the other natives of the Co-prosperity Sphere, and as we consider it a good example for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere. It is needless to say that in this case too they will have to cooperate positively in the war against Britain and the United States, and we shall hold onto our rights to station armies and to use certain places necessary as military bases even after the war.

5. Malaya and British Borneo

Military administration will be enforced for the present under the governor-general of the occupation territories; Singapore and Penang will be placed under his direct jurisdiction. The governor-general will be in direct control of the native rulers and dispatch the requisite controllers to their dominions to direct them. The administration of these dominions and of areas smaller than provinces will be carried on as far as possible on the lines of the existing machinery, through efforts must be made to obliterate British influence which has permeated all administrative organs, so that measures to reform the British way of ruling should be taken. We shall respect the native rulers' political measures and help to raise the (S.E. political) standard of the Malaysians. Furthermore, as regards the effect of economic reforms we will carry out a number of measures, giving the most consideration to the maintenance of public peace and order.

6. Netherlands East Indies

Military administration will be established under the governor-general and the existing administrative organs will be used to the utmost for minor or local administration. On the principle of Netherlands equality, some of the Dutch officials and Indonesians will be employed indifferently. The most important object in the Netherlands East Indies will be to fulfil our economic demands or those necessary to carry out the operations (especially petroleum), as this area will be adjacent to the front for some time, and strict military administration will be established. Measures to aid the promotion of the position of the Indonesians and to raise the standard of civilization must be adopted, to make the Indonesians gradually change their attitude towards the Dutch and give them the hope that in a certain period after the termination of hostilities, they will be permitted to enjoy independence.

7. Burma

Strict military administration will be established in Burma as it is expected to be adjacent to the front for quite a long period. However, the existence of the Burmese' own administrative organ will be recognized and this under our guidance will become the nucleus of an independent government in the future.

Handling

Handling of the Indians in Burma must be directed discreetly in consideration of the policy towards India.

Part III Economics

No. 1 Materials for national defence

1. Policy:

(1) Construction policy during this period is to restore and develop the production of national resources, especially mineral resources, and make these areas an important source of supply for the heavy industry materials necessary for the central power to accomplish the war, thereby aiming principally at the strengthening of our power to carry out the war.

(2) In construction and restoration special stress shall be laid on petroleum, iron ores, bauxite, copper and other non-iron metals. The production of iron ores is the basis, but a certain amount of reserve manufacturing equipment (the selection of non-iron metal ores and a part of the smelting process if possible) and quite a large amount of equipment for refining petroleum will be constructed and restored.

(3) As is the time limit for carrying out these works, for the first and second years, the aim will be the complete restoration of the damages done by the war, after that, the necessary increase in production will be attained.

(4) For the aim of procuring necessary materials rapidly, the areas where the least damage was done by the war will be selected.

However, greater importance is attached to the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines in the real construction, as great quantities of materials are expected to be procured in these areas.

(5) As for the method of construction, a national organization will be established to include the Southern Regions and unify and regulate the construction, and under the overall jurisdiction of this body, certain persons responsible for the development of a certain material in a certain area will be selected to undertake the increase of production.

(6) The production of such materials as would prove superfluous, such as rubber and tin, will be reduced to the amount necessary for our demands, and the margin of construction power will both be directed towards the more urgent demands. However, in order to avoid confusion in the economy of the area concerned, and to maintain powerful weapon in the armoury of economic warfare by the material concerned, a certain amount of production may still be maintained insofar as it does not prove a heavy burden on materials and labour.

- - - - -

Part IV Ideas and Culture

1. Work in the ideas and culture of the southern races must be carried out on the lines of general policy for the development of ideas and culture set out in Chapter V, and in consideration of the fact that these races have been but recently attached to us, that their standard of civilization is very low, that their racial characteristics are ones of mild behaviour and they hold no anti-Japanese feelings.

2. Instruction by reason

(1) Propaganda

As the knowledge of Japan held by the southern races is insufficient, every method and occasion must be turned to account for propagating the true Japan, and efforts should be made for the introduction of Japan through publications and the establishment of organizations to spread information about Japan. Lectures, exhibitions, moving pictures and musical concerts should be given and all other special methods adopted.

(2) It is necessary to comply with the characteristics and the civilization of each race when carrying out propaganda, which thus has a greater influence; further, the results of this propaganda must be thoroughly investigated, and the selection of the policy to follow also considered, so as to accord with the actual situation.

(3) The propaganda system in the Southern Regions must be extended and strengthened, and the main outline of the propaganda and essential parts of its organization must be held by the Japanese.

(4) Although the object of the propaganda is the controlling or intellectual class in each district, special methods of propaganda among the ignorant will also be adopted.

(5) It is necessary to think of a way to utilize the secret Chinese associations in the south for our propaganda.

(6) When the situation permits, it would be a good idea to make the controlling or intellectual class travel in Japan and introduce them to the real situation in Japan, thus making them discard their idea of relying on Europe and the U.S.A.

II Education:

(1) The existing method and policies should be reinvestigated and those based on the influence of Britain, the United States and the Netherlands should be abolished. Although changes in direction will be made according to the general policy, there will be no great changes in educational institutions during this period, and care will be taken to utilize existing institutions.

/ (2)